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REASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON STATE
LEGISLATIVE ELECTION OUTCOMES
VICTOR VUONG
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Major Professor: Maxwell Palmer, Assistant Professor of Political Science
ABSTRACT
I reassess the influence of presidential approval on state legislative election out-
comes, incorporating the period from the 1940s to the 1970s in my analysis. Previous
research finds that presidential approval has a significant effect, but such findings may
be biased-they focus on elections after the 1970s, when the president was more visible
to the public. Using an original state partisan balance dataset, I measure the effects
of presidential approval and find that it has as much influence on state legislative
elections from the 1940s to the early 1970s. These findings may engender concerns of
state legislative accountability-if state legislators’ electoral prospects become increas-
ingly reliant upon assessments of the president than themselves, they are less likely
to feel beholden to voters and uphold their interests.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
It is commonplace that voter turnout for state elections is lower compared to
their presidential counterparts—this trend has been common since the mid-nineteenth
century (McDonald 2014).1 And although prioritization of presidential elections is
unsurprising-they receive disproportionately greater amounts of media coverage-state
(legislative) elections are of great consequence to the everyday lives of voters. State
legislators determine “the types of taxes they [voters] pay, the education they receive,
the roads they drive, and the health and safety of their communities” (Squire 2015).
Nor is the influence of legislatures confined to their state boundaries. Legislators
controlled by the party opposite of the president can undermine the latter’s national
agenda. For example, Democrats suffered a net loss of more than eight hundred state
legislative seats during Barack Obama’s presidency2 and saw Republicans roll back
abortion and voting rights (Wall 2015; Yglesias 2015). In addition, state legislatures
influence federal elections by redrawing congressional lines. State legislative elections
are immensely important-their results affect state and national political issues in
numerous ways.
Scholars have long recognized the importance of state legislatures and studied their
election outcomes. Much of existing research argues that national factors, especially
presidential approval and the national economy, influence state legislative election
outcomes. However, it is unclear whether this relationship is longstanding or a recent
development. Most research studies elections after the 1970s, when presidents had
already assumed a prominent role in domestic and foreign policy and were highly
1 Prior to 1840, voter turnout rates in midterm elections tended to exceed turnout in presidential
elections.
2 Calculations of net legislative seat change vary. Wall (2015) uses a president’s first election and
their subsequent midterm elections. Other calculations include the first election of a president as
part of the previous president’s net legislative seat change and find net losses closer to 900 (Sabato,
Kondik, and Skelley 2013; Stanley and Niemi 2015).
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visible. Perhaps presidential approval had less influence prior to this period, when
the presidency was less visible. We cannot answer this question currently-the limited
research that studies this relationship prior to the ‘70s are less extensive than analyses
of later elections and face questions of generalizability. How much influence, then,
did presidential approval have on state legislative elections before the ‘70s?
In this paper, I seek to measure the effects of presidential approval from the 1940s
to the 1970s. I hypothesize that presidents were less visible in this period due to
differences in levels of presidential power, media coverage, and partisan polarization.
In turn, presidential approval should have a smaller effect on state legislative elections
from the ‘40s to the ‘70s than on state legislative elections from the ‘70s to present.
Using a dataset that reports state legislative election outcomes from as far back
as the late 1930s, I run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to measure the
effect of presidential approval on state house and senate elections, controlling for the
national economy, previous incumbent party seat share, and partisanship. When I
run regressions on state legislative elections from the ‘40s to the early ‘70s, I find
no significant difference in the effect of presidential approval compared to elections
from the ‘70s to present. The effect of presidential approval on state house elections
is significant and has remained consistent since the 1940s. However, presidential
approval does not have a significant effect on state senate elections. In addition, the
influence that presidential approval has on state legislative elections does not bode
well for accountability concerns-state legislators have little incentive to uphold their
constituents’ interests rather than their own if they do not benefit electorally from
doing so.
2
NATIONAL INFLUENCES IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
Much of existing literature asserts a relationship between national political factors
and state legislative election outcomes. Key (1956) found similar trajectories between
proportions of counties with Democratic presidential pluralities and proportions of
house seats won by Democrats in Missouri. Piereson (1975) found a strong relation-
ship between approval of President Nixon and Independents’ voting decisions at all
electoral levels in the 1970 midterm elections. More recent research suggests the pres-
ence of “balancing” effects in midterm elections, in which voters elect state legislators
whose party differs from the presidents (Bailey and Fullmer 2011). Using a general-
ized referendum voting model, Simon, Ostrom, and Marra (1991) finds presidential
approval was one of several variables that were statistically significant at all electoral
levels. Chubb (1988) finds that state legislators are electorally susceptible to national
economic swings rather than state economic conditions. Comparative political anal-
yses have also found similar results: scholars found national economic influences in
Argentine and Canadian state elections (Remmer and Ge´lineau 2003; Ge´lineau and
Be´langer 2005). They also found that voters use state legislative elections as a refer-
endum on national leaders in Britain and Germany (Piketty 2000; Kellermann 2008).
More recently, Steven Rogers’ work has continued to advance arguments of na-
tional influences in state legislative elections. He asserts that voters have little knowl-
edge of their state legislators: fewer of them follow news about state politics, know
who their state legislator is, are aware of their state representative’s daily activities, or
are sure of whether they approve of their state legislature (Rogers 2013; Leiserowitz,
Maibach, and Roser-Renouf 2009; Jewell 1982; Ansolabehere 2010). Since voters have
little to judge state legislators on their own merits, they turn towards national pol-
itics. Changes in state real disposable income (RDI), state homicide rates or crime
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indexes, and student performance on standardized tests have no meaningful relation
to state house majority party seat change (Rogers 2013). In contrast, presidential
approval and national RDI have strong effects on changes in state house seats held
by the presidents party (Rogers 2013).3 Voters tend to evaluate state legislators on
the basis of their party affiliation with the incumbent president rather than policy
performance.
Although literature measuring the effects of state variables exist, they are less
reliable. Mayo (2004), Bailey and Fullmer (2011), and Folke and Snyder (2012) find
that gubernatorial approval has some effect on state legislative elections but they
“employ limited samples and produce mixed results” (Rogers 2013). Rogers (2013)
finds that state legislative and gubernatorial approval have statistically significant
effects on probit estimates of state house vote choice.4 However, the study lacks
extended time series data-its vote choice data only uses Cooperative Congressional
Election Study (CCES) survey responses from 2008, 2010, and 2012. In addition,
the dependent variable in Rogers (2013) is vote choice rather than state legislative
election outcomes. Using the latter is preferable because it eliminates possibilities of
response bias. .
Although most scholarly analysis finds that national political variables affect state
legislative elections to some degree, most comprehensive existing research does not
go back further than the 1970s: Bailey and Fullmer (2011) examine state legislative
elections from 1978 to 2009 and Rogers (2013) uses a slightly longer dataset ranging
from 1972 to 2010. Campbell (1986) does examine aggregate state legislative elec-
3 Rogers also finds a statistically significant effect for state RDI but its statistical significance
disappears when controlling for presidential approval and the national economy, which both remain
significant. Statistical significance was at the p ≤ 0.05 level.
4 Rogers’ probit estimates for New Jersey and Virginia, which hold off-year elections, are less
fruitful-he finds that state legislative approval has statistically significant effects in only 1 of 9 years.
Gubernatorial approval fares better, having a significant effect in 1 of 3 years.
4
tion outcomes from 1944 to 1984 in 41 states, finding that presidential co-partisan
seat changes in presidential and midterm elections occur in proportion to the prior
presidential vote in the state, even after having controlled for gubernatorial coattail
effects.5 However, Campbell focuses on presidential coattail effects, not presiden-
tial approval. Although partisan polarization is an important measure, one which
I include in my own analysis, it is not sufficient. Approval is also necessary-voters’
opinions concerning the president are likely to affect the strength of their partisan
loyalty and whether they reward or punish presidential co-partisans in state legisla-
tive elections. In addition, my work improves upon Campbell’s by analyzing several
more states.
Since data on presidential approval and state legislative election outcomes go back
to as early as 1937, including them in any analysis is important. We cannot assume
that existing findings are generalizable to the mid-twentieth century because presi-
dential visibility in both periods were different. Presidential power had expanded so
much that the office had developed by the early ‘70s into what historian Arthur M.
Schlesinger termed “the imperial presidency.” Additional differences in media cover-
age and partisan polarization make it more likely that presidents after the ’70s were
more visible to voters, which affected the degree to which voters used their opinions
of the president in state legislative elections.
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
AND PRESIDENTIAL VISIBILITY
By the early 1970s, presidential power had expanded so much as to cause “un-
precedented exclusion of the rest of the executive branch, of Congress, of the press
5 Effects were “fairly modest in states lacking competitive parties” (Campbell 1986).
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and of public opinion in general” (Schlesinger 1973). Such characterizations were
made in response to the actions of presidents during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s,
who used large-scale events such as the Great Depression, World War II, and the
Korean and Vietnam Wars to expand their domestic and foreign policy powers. Pres-
idents cited the prerogative of their office to justify numerous actions, including the
internment of Japanese-Americans, seizure of steel mills, deployment of thousands
of troops to other countries, and the advancement of civil rights. The Nixon ad-
ministration was especially important to the development of the imperial presidency.
President Nixon’s paranoia and rejection of scrutiny led him to centralize governmen-
tal power as much as possible. He significantly expanded the number of personal staff
to control an increasing bureaucracy, more than doubling the number of employees
on the White House payroll from 1954 and the operating cost of the Executive Office
since his first term; and tripling the Executive Office Staff from 1963 (Schlesinger
1973).6 Nixon openly rejected the press, ordering the wiretapping of phones of any
offending newspapers and threatening the prosecution of networks who did not pro-
vide satisfactory amounts of media coverage of conservatives. In addition, Nixon used
impoundment frequently to control domestic policy7 and invoked executive privilege
to reject congressional requests for testimony or documents and limit access to gov-
ernment records.
Presidents after Nixon have taken advantage of the precedent that he and other
past presidents set, using their review powers to delay, change, or prevent the imple-
mentation of regulatory agency rules; distributing federal funds “disproportionately
to strongly co-partisan counties and states”; refusing congressional requests for docu-
6 The White House’s payroll grew from 266 in 1954 to 600 in 1971, Executive Office staff grew
from 1,164 in 1963 to 5,395 in 1971, and the Executive Office’s operating cost increased from $31
million to $71 million.
7 Nixon impounded nearly $15 billion in funds by 1973, which covered more than one hundred
federal programs and constituted 17 to 20 percent of controllable funds (Schlesinger 1973).
6
mentation; deploying troops without congressional authorization; holding individuals
with suspected terrorist ties indefinitely without charges; and expanding their pros-
ecutorial and surveillance powers (Moe and Howell 1999; Kriner and Reeves 2015;
Rudalevige 2005). Presidential power is also likely to continue to expand: the Con-
stitution describes presidential powers vaguely, which allow for broad interpretations
of their authority; executive actions often serve as precedent for future expansions of
power; limits on the judiciary often leave decisions regarding the limits of presidential
power to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which,
as extensions of the executive branch, are likely to issue broad interpretations; the
growth of the federal bureaucracy increases the power of the president, who serves as
its head; presidents use directives and other means to assume increasing administra-
tive control over the federal bureaucracy; intelligence agencies provide the president
with information that Congress does not have, forcing the latter to rely upon the
former for expertise; the President possesses a greater ability to obtain media cov-
erage as the chief executive of the nation; the president can leverage public support
to enhance political capital;8 the president has tremendous power as Commander-in-
Chief of various military and intelligence agencies; the president can act more quickly
to respond to real time developments in the modern world and their decisions are
not likely to be reversed; and partisan polarization incentivizes co-partisan members
of Congress to ensure the President’s success for electoral reasons, diminishing the
independence and power of their own institution (Marshall 2008).
Presidential power in the 1970s did not go unchecked, however. Cronin (1980)
details the numerous steps that Congress took to reassert their authority after the
Watergate scandal, including passing the War Powers Act; creating the Congressional
8 The president may use public support indirectly or directly. In the former, a president’s
popular support incentivizes Congress to work with them-the president need not take any action. In
the latter, the president appeals the public to pressure their members of Congress (Kernell 2006).
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Budget Office; and prohibiting presidents from impounding funds without congres-
sional approval. In addition, one might argue that presidents before the ‘70s were
or appeared more powerful. The events which presidents used to justify expanding
their powers in the ‘40s, ‘50s, and ‘60s-the Great Depression, World War II, and the
Korean and Vietnam Wars-were large scale events, often more so than events from
the ‘70s onwards. Presidents were given a great deal of authority, which they ex-
ercised, to address such issues. If the public focused on these monumental events
and how presidents responded to them, they may have weighted presidential ap-
proval more heavily when voting for or against state co-partisan legislators. There
is at least some evidence that presidents exercised more power in these periods: fig-
ures 1 and 2 show that presidents in this period issued more executive agreements
and orders than after.9 Nevertheless, I suspect that presidents serving since the
‘70s exercised as much power. As figures 3 and 4 show, these presidents employed
9 Estimates were obtained from Shull (2006); Pika, Maltese, and Rudalevige (2017); and Peters
and Woolley (2017).
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a higher number of White House and Executive Office Staff on average.10 They have
used similar watershed moments such as the September 11th, 2001 terror attacks
and the Great Repression to exercise as much, if not more, unilateral power than
their predecessors. Presidents have also received more media coverage as a result
of shifting political norms and other developments.11 Lastly, partisan polarization
has increased significantly. Findings from Pew Research Center (2014) show that
Democrats and Republicans were more ideologically divided (Democrats were more
consistently liberal and Republicans were more consistently conservative) than in the
past; more likely to view the other party “as a threat to the nation”; and supporters
and opponents of the president were likely to intensify in their positions. Similarly,
Abramowitz and Webster (2016) show that increasingly negative views held by party
10 Estimates were obtained from Stanley and Niemi (2015).
11 Until 1968, presidential nominees were selected “by the parties’ elected and organizational lead-
ers” (Patterson 1993). By then, candidates “were [already] increasingly conducting their campaigns
through media, particularly television” in the ‘60s (Patterson 1993). This established a trend, in
which candidates, and then presidents, bypassed traditional political institutions in favor of the
media. Media coverage has continued to increase with the development of online election media,
independent political news sites, citizen journalism, and social networking sites (Owen 2009).
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supporters toward the opposing party “has led to dramatic increases in party loy-
alty and straight-ticket voting, a steep decline in the advantage of incumbency and
growing consistency between the results of presidential elections and the results of
House, Senate and even state legislative elections.” Considering all of these factors,
presidents were likely more visible to voters, who would correspondingly use their
opinions of presidents to evaluate state legislative co-partisans.
A review of the historical record shows that voters since the ‘70s likely perceived
presidents as retaining and exercising more decision-making power in administrative
and policy arenas than voters prior to this period did. It stands to reason, then,
that these presidents will have an increased presence in the minds of voters. Voters
are more likely to pay attention if they believe presidents are increasingly involved in
policies that affect either their life directly or the direction of the country. However,
many voters do not follow politics so effects may not be as strong as expected. If
we expect activist presidents, in a period with increased media coverage and parti-
sanship, to be more present in the minds of voters in state legislative elections, the
reverse should also be true. If presidents were not perceived as activist or having
much administrative and policy decision-making power, they should be less salient
in the minds of voters. Thus, voters may have relied less on their opinions of the
president to judge state legislative co-partisans. To test this hypothesis, I measure
the effect of presidential approval on state legislative election outcomes in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s. By including data from earlier elections, I am near doubling the
dataset of previous analyses and measuring the effect of presidential approval on state
legislative elections since the beginning of such polling questions. Doing so will give us
a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of presidential approval on state
legislative election outcomes. We will learn whether reduced presidential power in
earlier periods correlates with decreased voter considerations of presidential approval
10
or if there is no substantive difference and presidential approval has influenced state
legislative elections since the 1940s.
Although I only address the expansion of presidential power since the late 1930s,
it was not limited to such period of course. When Associate Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Miller wrote in In re Neagle (1890) that presidents were not limited to en-
forcing acts of Congress or treaties, they began to act accordingly.12 Similar to its
succeeding period, Congress still retained a great deal of control in the early twenti-
eth century. Woodrow Wilson, one of the architects of the modern presidency with
Theodore Roosevelt, regularly sought congressional authorization during World War
I. It is reasonable then to believe that this time period is also ideal to analyze the
effects of national variables on state legislative elections. However, I do not include
the early twentieth century in my analysis because presidential approval and national
economic data are lacking for such period.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
I run OLS regressions to measure the effects of presidential approval on state leg-
islative election outcomes in the mid-twentieth century, relying on polling data and
an original state partisan balance dataset. Most presidential approval data consists of
Gallup polls that the American Presidency Project (APP) compiled. The American
Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) and Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR)
12 Presidents mostly assumed more foreign policy powers. Some examples include William McKin-
ley ordering 5,000 troops to China without congressional consultation; Theodore Roosevelt sending
troops into Caribbean countries and installing provisional governments without “prior congressional
sanction”; William Howard Taft saying that he could get the US into war and force Congress to act;
and Woodrow Wilson intervening in Central America and the Caribbean to protect U.S. citizens
and fulfill treaty provisions and requests from local governments (Schlesinger 1973). However, Roo-
sevelt and Taft did apply presidential prerogative to exclude congressionally requested information
on domestic policy areas as well.
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provided poll data for some of the years in the early ‘40s.13 I use only the last poll
before the November election of any given year because it is the most accurate rep-
resentation of how voters feel about the president before they cast their ballots. It is
unlikely voters remember, let alone consider, their feelings about the president from
months prior to casting their ballots. If voters feel strongly about past events, they
should be reflected in the most recent poll. The original state partisan balance dataset
was created by Carl Klarner14 and includes the number of Democratic, Independent,
and Republican state representatives and senators serving in any given year from
1937 to 2011.
I use a different dataset than in past analyses. For example, Rogers (2013) uses
a dataset that contains information from actual state legislative general election re-
turns. However, there should not be any substantive differences since the number
of state legislators from a given party serving in a given year correspond to its elec-
tion year. For instance, the number of Democrats serving in a state house in 2013
corresponds to general election results from 2012. There may be minor differences
from seat vacancies, but those will not have any meaningful effect on overall results.
Using state partisan compositions from the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL), I add data for the years from 2012 to 2015 to Klarner’s dataset. To calculate
state legislative seat change, I look at the change in proportion of house and senate
seat shares from the previous election to the following election year. I exclude data
from Nebraska, because it has a unicameral, non-partisan legislature. I also exclude
13 I use AIPO data to measure presidential approval in 1938 and OPOR data to measure presi-
dential approval in 1943 and 1944. The AIPO poll data for November 1938 does not specify the day
so it may have occurred after the election. I still use the data because it is one of the only available
polls available for that period and there should not be a significant difference from this poll if it
did occur after the 1938 midterm election and how voters felt about President Roosevelt before the
election as it covers the same month as the election. I use data from OPOR instead of APP for 1943
because the former’s poll is closer to November: OPOR’s poll is in September and APPs poll data
for 1943 ends in March. Poll data from 1939 to 1942 comes from Gallup.
14 Klarner’s original datasets can be found at http://klarnerpolitics.com/index.html.
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data from Alaska and Hawaii before 1959, when they were still U.S. territories. Lastly,
I do not consider Independent legislators because I am only interested in looking at
seat changes from one major political party to another. If an Independent wins a
Democrat or Republican’s seat, or vice versa, the seat change does not count towards
the net seat gain or loss for the incumbent president’s party. I also do not count seat
changes caused by vacancies. I do not control for seat share change that results from
the total number of seats in a state chamber changing, but the total number of seats
changes for only a small proportion of the dataset.
I control for the national economy by using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) un-
employment rates rather than the change in yearly logged RDI.15 There is more data
on unemployment rates and previous analyses have found similar results using both
measures so there should not be a problem (Rogers 2013). State and local economic
unemployment data is limited so I do not add a control for the state economy. There
is data on state total disposable personal income, but it excludes nearly a third of the
years between the 1940s and 1970s. Excluding the variable may not affect my results
much though as past analyses did not find any substantive effects-Rogers (2013) found
that the state economy had a significant effect in one model, but it did not control for
presidential approval and the national economy. The effect disappeared after control-
ling for those variables. I likewise do not control for non-economic variables such as
crime and education. Past analyses used annual changes in a state’s crime index, state
average SAT scores, and National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) reading
exam scores to assess the effects of crime, and state and national educational perfor-
mance. However, crime index data is not available until 1972. Similarly, the earliest
available SAT and NAEP data is from 1988. Rogers (2013) found that a state’s crime
15 BLS unemployment rates are available from 1941 onwards and Lebergott (1964) provides un-
employment rates for 1940.
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index, state SAT scores, and NAEP scores had no statistically significant effects in
any of his models so excluding them may not have meaningfully affected my results.16
My regression also includes controls for a party’s previous incumbent seat share
and partisan polarization in states. Previous seat share affects the number of seats
that the incumbent party can win or lose in the next election. If I do not control for
previous incumbent party seat share, then I may over- or underestimate the influence
of presidential approval in the following elections.17 In addition, I use votes for the
incumbent president’s party in the most recent presidential election, known as the
prior presidential vote, to control for partisanship. For example, the proportion of
votes for the Democratic Party in the 1960 presidential election represents the prior
presidential vote for the years from 1961 to 1963. I obtain prior presidential vote
data through the APP, which compiles Federal Election Commission (FEC) election
results. I substitute the prior presidential vote for congressional vote change, the
measure for partisan polarization in past analyses, to avoid district bias. Any partic-
ular district may heavily favor one political party over the other. Such discrepancy
will over de- or inflate congressional vote change, which sums the votes of districts.
However, the prior presidential vote avoids this problem. The difference in votes for
Democrats and Republicans in a presidential election are large enough that disputes
seldom occur.
In summary, I run several regressions to measure state legislative election out-
comes as a function of presidential approval. First, I run a regression for the years
from 1972 to 2015 to ensure that my exclusion of some explanatory variables from
past analyses and use of different data as measures for other explanatory variables
16 Rogers was measuring state house majority party seat change rather than presidential co-
partisan state seat share change.
17 Other analyses use a state legislative party’s seat change in the previous election (Rogers
2013). However, there should be no significant difference-they both control for electoral exposure
(Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986).
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have not resulted in findings substantively different than those in past analyses.18 If
presidential approval no longer had a significant effect on state legislative elections
from the ‘70s to present, it would not matter if my findings showed that presidential
approval did not have a significant effect on elections from the ‘40s to the ‘70s. I need
to ensure that my slight deviations in empirical approach do not change the effect
that presidential approval has on elections from the ‘70s to present so I can observe
whether such effect changes for elections from the ‘40s to the ‘70s. I run a regression
for the years from 1941 to 1971 to measure such change in the effect of presidential
approval and other explanatory variables. Lastly, I run a regression for all years from
1941 to 2015 to provide an estimate for the entire time series. For this regression, I
include a dummy variable for all years after 1971. I add an interaction term between
the dummy variable and presidential approval to see whether the difference in effect
of presidential approval from 1941 to 1971 and from 1972 to 2015 is significant. I
run regressions for state house and state senate election outcomes separately so there
will be six regressions in total. Each regression has state fixed effects. Therefore, I
estimate the following model:
State Legislative Election Outcomesstc = β0 + β1*Presidential Approvalt
+ β2*Unemployment Ratet
+ β4*Past Incumbent Party Seat Sharestc
+ β3*Prior Presidential Votest
+ β5*Post-1971
+ β6*[Post-1971*Presidential Approvalt]
+ StateFEs + ε
where s, t and c index state, time (i.e. year) and legislative chamber, respectively.
Also, β5 and β6 only apply to regressions for the entire time series-regressions for the
18 See earlier paragraphs in this section for a detailed explanation of such changes.
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period from 1941 to 1971 or from 1972 to 2015 do not include the dummy variable or
interaction effect.
I expect that presidential approval had less influence on state legislative elections
from the 1940s to the early 1970s. As I noted earlier in the section on the imperial
presidency, presidential visibility from the ‘70s onwards is greater than from the ‘40s
to the ‘70s. Therefore, voters in the earlier period may have thought about the pres-
ident less and judged state legislators by their own merits. One should note that my
hypothesis does not discount the possibility of a positive result. Presidential power
and activity, media coverage, and/or partisanship in the mid-twentieth may have been
sufficient enough that people were already using their considerations of the president
in state legislative elections then. Or it is possible that people have always used
presidential approval as a measure by which to elect/re-elect or reject the president’s
state legislative co-partisans. After all, the presidency is not a position that lends
itself to inconspicuousness. Nevertheless, presidential approval can have a significant
effect on state legislative elections from the ‘40s to the early ‘70s and still support
my hypothesis as long as the effect is substantively lower than the effect presidential
approval has had on state legislative elections from the ‘70s to the present. Thus, I
posit that voters thought less about the president from the 1940s to the early 1970s
and presidential approval had substantively less influence on state legislative elections
in this period.
Two other findings are possible with a positive result-no significant difference or an
increase in the extent to which presidential approval affects state legislative elections
from the 1940s to the 1970s. Although I outlined several ways in which presidents
expanded their power from the ‘70s onwards, voter considerations of the president
may fail to account for them. For example, presidents used regulatory reviews to
expand their influence over federal agencies, but it is not clear whether voters knew
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or cared much about it. If true, then such activities are irrelevant because they were
not part of the criteria by which voters judged the president. Depending on how
much voters weighted presidential responses to certain events from the ‘40s to the
‘70s, presidential approval may have factored as or more heavily in judgements of
state legislative co-partisans.
RESULTS
OLS regressions show no significant difference in the effect of presidential approval
between state legislative elections from the 1970s to present and state legislative elec-
tions from the 1940s to the 1970s. Since some of my variables differ from those used in
past studies, I rerun OLS regressions for state legislative election results from the ‘70s
to present. Tables 1 and 2 show that presidential approval has a significant effect on
state house and senate elections in this period.19 Controlling for the unemployment
rate, previous incumbent party seat share, and the prior presidential vote, we can ex-
pect the legislative seat share of presidential co-partisans to increase by 0.7 percent in
state house elections, relative to the total number of seats in their respective cham-
bers, when presidential approval increases by 10 percent. The unemployment rate
also has a strong effect: presidential co-partisans lose 4.2 percent of state house seats
if unemployment increases by 10 percent. For state senate elections, neither presi-
dential approval or unemployment has a significant effect on seat share change. As
expected, previous incumbent party seat share and seat share change are negatively
correlated: a 10 percent increase in the former variable correlates to a 1.2 percent
seat share loss in state house elections and a 1.1 percent seat share loss in state senate
elections. Lastly, a 10 percent increase in the prior presidential vote correlates to a
1.2 seat share gain in state house elections and a 1.2 percent seat share gain in
19 State fixed effects show no significant within state variation.
17
Table 1: Presidential Co-Partisan State House Seat Share Change,
1972-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Presidential Approval 0.129∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Unemployment Rate −0.173 −0.315∗ −0.416∗∗
(0.159) (0.154) (0.154)
Previous Incumbent Party Seat Share −0.104∗∗ −0.118∗∗
(0.012) (0.013)
Prior Presidential Vote 0.117∗∗
(0.027)
Constant −0.078∗∗ −0.063∗ −0.006 −0.041
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
N 939 939 939 939
R2 0.076 0.078 0.145 0.164
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.026 0.096 0.114
Note: ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01
Table 2: Presidential Co-Partisan State Senate Seat Share Change,
1972-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Presidential Approval 0.100∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.046
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Unemployment Rate 0.049 −0.127 −0.242
(0.179) (0.176) (0.177)
Previous Incumbent Party Seat Share −0.093∗∗ −0.107∗∗
(0.013) (0.014)
Prior Presidential Vote 0.123∗∗
(0.030)
Constant −0.072∗∗ −0.076∗ −0.020 −0.056
(0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
N 872 872 872 872
R2 0.065 0.066 0.118 0.135
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.009 0.063 0.081
Note: ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01
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state senate elections. Therefore, my regressions for elections from the 1970s to
present produces similar results found in past analyses.
Looking at OLS regressions for state legislative elections from the 1940s to the
1970s, I find that the effect of presidential approval is comparable. Tables 3 and 4
show the regression results for state house and senate elections from 1941 to 1971.
In Table 3, presidential approval actually has a slightly greater effect on state house
elections-a 10 percent increase in approval correlates to a 0.8 percent seat share gain
although its level of significance has decreased. The unemployment rate has a much
stronger effect on state house elections from 1941 to 1971: presidential co-partisans
lose 1.4 percent of seats if unemployment increases by one percent. The effects of
the other control variables are stronger as well: a 10 percent increase in previous
incumbent party seat share and the prior presidential vote correlate to 1.7 percent
seat share losses and gains, respectively. In summary, presidential approval has a
comparable effect on elections from the ‘40s to the ‘70s in comparison to its effect on
elections from the ‘70s to the present.
In Table 4, presidential approval has no significant effect on state senate elections
from the 1940s to the 1970s. Presidential approval and the unemployment rate are
both statistically insignificant. However, previous incumbent party seat share and
the prior presidential vote remain significant. A 10 percent increase in previous in-
cumbent party seat share correlates to a 1.5 percent seat share loss and a 10 percent
increase in the prior presidential vote correlates to a 2.3 percent seat share gain.
Similar to Table 3, the effects of previous incumbent party seat share and the prior
presidential vote are stronger for the period from 1941 to 1971 than afterwards.
Tables 5 and 6 display the regression results for the entire time series, although
the models are different than in previous tables. The first and second models of these
tables replicate the regressions from 1941 to 1971 and from 1972 to 2015 (model 4 in
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Table 3: Presidential Co-Partisan State House Seat Share Change,
1941-1971
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Presidential Approval 0.101∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.083∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Unemployment Rate 0.038 −1.379∗∗ −1.390∗∗
(0.178) (0.358) (0.355)
Previous Incumbent Party Seat Share −0.136∗∗ −0.170∗∗
(0.017) (0.020)
Prior Presidential Vote 0.171∗∗
(0.054)
Constant −0.052 −0.053 0.099 0.038
(0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.055)
N 733 733 687 686
R2 0.039 0.039 0.139 0.153
Adjusted R2 -0.030 -0.031 0.070 0.083
Note: ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01
Table 4: Presidential Co-Partisan State Senate Seat Share Change,
1941-1971
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Presidential Approval 0.049 0.055 0.056 0.030
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Unemployment −0.131 −0.552 −0.573
(0.163) (0.338) (0.333)
Previous Incumbent Party Seat Share −0.109∗∗ −0.151∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
Prior Presidential Vote 0.233∗∗
(0.049)
Constant −0.033 −0.029 0.055 −0.030
(0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.050)
N 700 700 654 653
R2 0.048 0.049 0.115 0.147
Adjusted R2 -0.024 -0.025 0.040 0.073
Note: ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01
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Table 5: Presidential Co-Partisan State House Seat Share Change,
1941-2015
(1941- (1972- (1941- 1941-
1971) 2015) 2015) 2015)
Presidential Approval 0.083∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.033) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025)
Unemployment Rate −1.390∗ −0.416∗∗ −0.503∗∗ −0.793∗∗
(0.355) (0.154) (0.138) (0.167)
Previous Incumbent Party Seat Share −0.170∗∗ −0.118∗∗ −0.140∗∗ −0.139∗∗
(0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Prior Presidential Vote 0.171∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.140∗∗
(0.054) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Post-1971 0.031
(0.022)
Post-1971 x Presidential Approval −0.026
(0.039)
Constant 0.038 −0.041 −0.018 −0.021
(0.055) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
N 686 939 1,625 1,625
R2 0.153 0.164 0.128 0.134
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.114 0.099 0.104
Note: ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01
Tables 1 through 4), respectively; model 3 shows the regression results for the en-
tire term series; and model 4 adds a dummy variable for years after 1971 and an
interaction term between the dummy and presidential approval. In Table 5, the in-
teraction between the dummy variable for years after 1971 and presidential approval
is insignificant: there is only a 0.03 percent difference in the effect of presidential ap-
proval on state house seat share gain between the periods from 1941 to 1971 and after.
Therefore, the effect of presidential approval on state house elections has remained
consistent since the 1940s. Considering the entire time series, the unemployment rate
has a significant effect on state house elections: a 10 percent increase in unemploy-
ment correlates to a 7.9 percent seat share loss. Previous incumbent party seat share
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Table 6: Presidential Co-Partisan State Senate Seat Share Change,
1941-2015
(1941- (1972- (1941- 1941-
1971) 2015) 2015) 2015)
Presidential Approval 0.030 0.046 0.027 0.035
(0.030) (0.027) (0.019) (0.024)
Unemployment Rate −0.573 −0.242 −0.149 −0.397∗
(0.333) (0.177) (0.139) (0.168)
Previous Incumbent Party Seat Share −0.151∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.124∗∗ −0.123∗∗
(0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Prior Presidential Vote 0.233∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.165∗∗
(0.049) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027)
Post-1971 0.019
(0.022)
Post-1971 x Presidential Approval −0.006
(0.040)
Constant −0.030 −0.056 −0.053 −0.053
(0.050) (0.032) (0.027) (0.028)
N 653 872 1,525 1,525
R2 0.147 0.135 0.123 0.127
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.081 0.092 0.095
Note: ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01
and the prior presidential vote are also significant: a 10 percent increase in these vari-
ables correlate to a 1.4 percent seat share loss and gain, respectively. Within Table 6,
the difference in the effect of presidential approval is miniscule: presidential approval
itself has an insignificant effect on state senate elections. The unemployment rate has
a significant effect: a 10 percent increase correlates to a 4 percent seat share loss. A
10 percent increase in previous incumbent party seat share correlates to a 1.2 percent
seat share loss and a 10 percent increase in the prior presidential vote correlates to a
1.7 percent seat share gain.
The difference in effect of presidential approval in different time periods may be
easier to comprehend in Figures 5 and 6, which use scatterplots to visualize the linear
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Figure 5: Linear Relationship Between Presidential Approval and State
House Seat Share Change
Figure 6: Linear Relationship Between Presidential Approval and State
Senate Seat Share Change
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relationship between presidential approval (and the control variables) and state seat
share change.20 The slopes of the regression lines for presidential approval and the
unemployment rate are gradual and the data points are weakly distributed along
the lines. In contrast, the regression lines for previous incumbent party seat share
and the prior presidential vote slope more steeply and data points are concentrated
much more strongly around them. Previous incumbent party seat share and the
prior presidential vote are stronger indicators of state legislative seat share change for
presidential co-partisans than presidential approval or the unemployment rate.
DISCUSSION
The findings from the results section oppose my hypothesis: presidential approval
has a comparable effect on state house election outcomes from 1941 to 1971 than
it does on elections from 1972 to 2015. By examining election outcomes from the
1940s to the 1970s, which past studies have neglected, I find that presidential ap-
proval on state legislative elections continues to have as significant an effect on state
house elections in this period. However, presidential approval does not have a sig-
nificant effect on state senate elections in either period. Presidents have maintained
roughly similar levels of power and visibility since the 1940s. In fact, presidents since
the ‘70s may have had slightly less power with increased media coverage and par-
tisan polarization making up for the difference. Perhaps the effect of presidential
approval may diminish if we could go back further, when presidents had significantly
less decision-making power in administrative and policy arenas, but data for such pe-
riod are lacking. Therefore, the effect of presidential approval on state house elections
has existed since the 1940s, but presidential approval has not significantly influenced
20 Scatterplots for the entire time series reflect the third models of Tables 5 and 6, which do not
include the dummy variable or interaction term.
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state senate elections.
Readers should note that I excluded several variables from my analysis. I dropped
controls for the state economy, crime, and education, due to limited availability of
data. Since previous analyses did not find any lasting significant effects from these
variables, they likely did not affect my results much (Rogers 2013).21 More broadly,
I narrowed the scope of this work to measure the effects of presidential approval,
excluding approval of governors and state legislatures. Polling data for both were too
scarce to incorporate in my analysis (Richardson Jr., Konisky, and Milyo 2012; Saad
2011; Squire 1993). Since gubernatorial and state legislative approval likely have
some effect-the former is chief executive of the state constituents live in and the lat-
ter is approval of the actual people whom voters are casting ballots for or against-my
estimates may include the effects of these variables and be overestimating the effect
of presidential approval.
This work presents several interesting findings important to the study of Ameri-
can politics, which other scholars may want to consider if they plan to conduct future
analyses within this field. First, there exists a certain level of uncontrollability in state
legislative elections: the electoral chances of co-partisan state legislators and candi-
dates are subject to national tides. Since they have limited influence on the incumbent
president’s approval ratings, they can only hope that presidential approval does not
decline too steeply. Perhaps state co-partisans could regain some influence over their
own electoral prospects if they were to sponsor more legislation, speak with more con-
stituents, and obtain more media coverage. However, state co-partisans face an uphill
battle. State legislators and candidates have far fewer resources-monetary, political
or otherwise-to advertise themselves and their achievements. Furthermore, minimal
21 Rogers (2013) did find a statistically significant effect for state RDI at the p ≤ 0.05 level in one
model, but its statistical significance disappeared after controlling for all variables (i.e. presidential
approval, national RDI, previous seat change, congressional vote change).
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media coverage and voter attention makes it difficult to distance themselves from the
president. As time passes, they pay increasingly more attention to the Commander-
in-Chief than their state legislators. Therefore, we need to consider other means of
incentivizing voters to judge state legislative candidates on their own merits rather
than their co-partisanship with the president.
Natural experiments may serve as a useful tool for further study of the relation-
ship between approval and state legislative election outcomes. One might look at the
effect of presidential approval on state legislative elections in other countries where
presidents have less power. Do voters in such countries judge their state legislators
on the basis of their own actions or merits? Is state legislative accountability higher
in these areas because legislators know that their actions can affect their electoral
prospects? Any results may provide some insight into how American voters might
behave in a similar environment. Such study would require careful analysis to sep-
arate any across-country differences that may influence the dependent variable and
isolate the effect of approval. If one desired to remain within the U.S., analyses may
focus on the state-level and whether gubernatorial and mayoral approval demonstrate
similar effects to presidential approval. However, the scarcity of data presents a major
obstacle to conducting useful analyses. I have already discussed the lack of guber-
natorial and state legislative approval data-mayoral approval should have the same
issue as well.
If presidential visibility expands, that does not bode well for concerns about state
legislative accountability. If voters do not reward state legislators for their work, the
latter have little incentive to uphold the interests of their constituents (Rogers 2013).
Rather, they have greater incentive to follow their own ideological or partisan inter-
ests. Or state legislators may be more inclined to adhere to personal interests. If
the effect of presidential approval on state legislative elections does not have a ceiling
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and continues to increase, state legislative accountability will likely decrease. Unless
other means of increasing legislators’ capacity to affect their electoral prospects exist,
the U.S. may stray further from long-standing norms of representation and account-
ability.
One possible means through which state legislators may increase control over
their own electoral prospects is gerrymandering. For example, the Republican State
Leadership Committee’s (RSLC) Redistricting Majority Program (REDMAP) con-
tributed to electoral victories in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin in
2010, securing them control over the state legislative and congressional redistricting
process (2012 REDMAP Summary Report). By creating safer or more competitive
districts, gerrymandering may reduce the impact of presidential approval. However,
gerrymandering has its own limits. First, it may reduce state legislative responsive-
ness to small changes in presidential approval, but it likely cannot offset effects from
large changes in approval. If a president’s approval drops by twenty points, their
party is likely to lose a significant share of state legislative seats. Any plan that
could possibly offset such changes would require extreme manipulation and face legal
challenges.22 Aside from issues of legality or pragmatism, serious normative concerns
about the use of gerrymandering to offset the effect of presidential approval also exist
when taking into account its effect on American democracy.
CONCLUSION
Existing scholarship posits the role of national conditions in state legislative elec-
tion outcomes. Although some analyses focus on the influence of state variables, they
are not as comprehensive or reliable as those focusing on national influences. I mea-
22 Courts have generally not struck down gerrymandering on partisan grounds although Wiscon-
sin’s gerrymander was struck down in November 2016 for intentionally and egregiously favoring the
Republican party (Soffen 2016).
27
sure the effects of presidential approval on state legislative election outcomes from the
1940s to the 1970s and find that the effect of presidential approval does not change for
state house elections. Similarly, the unemployment rate has had a significant effect
on state house elections since the ‘40s. For state senate elections, the effects of pres-
idential approval and the unemployment are insignificant for the entire time series.
Previous incumbent party seat share and the prior presidential vote remain significant
throughout. My findings suggest that the influence of presidential approval on state
legislative elections has existed for at least the past seventy to eighty years in state
house elections. These findings have important implications for our understanding
about the scope of American presidential power and state legislative accountability.
Were the effect of presidential approval to increase, state legislative co-partisans would
lose the capacity to affect their own electoral prospects independent of the president.
If good governance does not increase legislators’ likelihood of re-election, they have
little incentive to advocate policies with their constituents in mind. Legislators are
far more likely to support policies that align with their personal ideological positions.
If long-standing norms regarding representation and accountability are to persist, we
must find a way to reduce the effect of presidential approval on state legislative out-
comes and increase the likelihood that voters judge the president’s co-partisan state
legislators on their own merits.
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